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Abstract
The profound transformations in Chile’s party structure since 1989 has led several
authors to examine the main cleavages shaping partisan divide and the impact of different
factors on citizens’ party preferences. No study, however, has examined the influence
of these factors on actual vote choice. We implement a Bayesian multinomial probit
model to analyze voter choice in Chile’s 2005 election. We show that the authoritarian-
democratic cleavage dominated voter choice, with socio-demographic variables playing a
less important role. We also find that the presence of a second conservative candidate
significantly affected citizens’ electoral behavior, increasing the support for the right and
influencing the electoral outcome in a way that cannot be accounted for by analyses
focused exclusively on citizens’ party identification.
JEL classification numbers: J222, F88
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1.   Introduction 
Chile’s post-authoritarian party structure, dominated by two stable and solid 
multiparty coalitions, contrasts with the highly fragmented system existing prior to the 
1973 military coup (Valenzuela and Scully, 1997; Tironi and Agüero, 1999; Alemán and 
Saiegh, 2007). Since the re-establishment of democracy, the center-left Concertación 
coalition, comprising the Socialist Party (PS), the Party for Democracy (PD), the 
Christian Democrats (CD) and the Radical Social-Democratic Party (PRSD), has been in 
control of the presidency and held the majority of the legislative seats. The other major 
coalition, the conservative Alianza por Chile, is made up of the Independent Democratic 
Union (UDI), the National Renewal Party (RN) and the Centrist Union (UCC). Although 
other minor parties exist outside these blocks, the two coalitions have dominated 
contemporary politics in Chile. 
There has been considerable debate among scholars about the reshaping of the Chilean 
political system and about the relative influence of different factors on voters’ behavior in 
this new setting (Valenzuela and Scully, 1997; Tironi and Agüero, 1999; Torcal and 
Mainwaring, 2003). Some authors argue that the social and cultural cleavages (in 
particular, class and religious divisions) that originally structured the Chilean political 
system still play a predominant role in defining political identities, and that the division 
between supporters and opponents of the authoritarian regime that marked the  
democratic transition was the result of a particular historical background and is likely to 
fade away as democracy is consolidated (Scully, 1995; Valenzuela, 1999; Bonilla, 2002). 
Other researchers, however, maintain that the new authoritarian-democratic cleavage has 
come to dominate party competition, integrating and reorganizing traditional sources of 
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partisan divide and reflecting intense discrepancies about regime preferences and 
conceptions of democracy in the Chilean society that are likely to subsist (Tironi and 
Agüero, 1999; Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003). 
The 2005 Presidential election offers an especially interesting opportunity to test these 
alternative explanations in an electoral setting, while at the same time exhibiting 
distinctive characteristics that bring about substantive and methodological implications 
that have received little attention in the literature on voter behavior in Chile.  It was the 
fourth Presidential election since Chile’s return to democracy, held at a time  of 
continuing economic growth and high popularity of the incumbent Concertación 
government, and with Pinochet relegated to a marginal role in the national political scene 
(Bonilla, 2002; Angell and Reig, 2006). Also, for the first time in its history, the two 
main partners of the Alianza por Chile, UDI and RN, presented independent candidates 
who adopted relatively different electoral strategies: while Lavín (UDI) adopted an 
aggressive campaigning style aimed at consolidating the vote among his right-wing 
supporters, the candidate of the National Renewal Party, Sebastián Piñera, took a more 
moderate stance, distancing himself from the traditional right and the legacy of the 
military regime in order to capture the support of centre in view of the almost certain 
second-round runoff between the candidate of the Concertación and one of the two 
conservative candidates (Angell and Reig, 2006; Gamboa and Segovia, 2006). Together 
with the formation of the left-wing alliance Juntos Podemos Más, this resulted in 
relatively clear leftist (Juntos Podemos Más), center-left (Concertación), center-right 
(RN) and rightist (UDI) electoral options available for Chilean voters.  
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In order to analyze the relative influence of socio-demographic, ideological and 
political variables on voter choice at the individual level, we specify and estimate a 
Bayesian multinomial probit model that explicitly accounts for the multi-party character 
of the election by letting voters evaluate all competing candidates simultaneously and to 
‘group’ alternatives they consider similar when choosing for which candidate to vote. 
Our model allows testing the relative validity of the competing theories in explaining 
voters’ electoral behavior. In addition, it enables us to examine other factors that might 
have had substantial influence in this particular election, such as the presence of a second 
conservative contestant and its effect on voters’ behavior in the view of the second-round 
runoff.  
Therefore, the paper offers two important contributions with respect to prior studies of 
the Chilean case. First, while past research analyzed citizens’ party identification or vote 
intention (Frei, 2003; Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003), no study has so far examined actual 
vote choice at the individual level. Theoretical and empirical arguments indicate that 
party identification and vote intention are dynamic concepts influenced by election-
specific circumstances and campaign effects, and that there is no linear relationship 
between party preferences and actual vote (Franklin and Jackson, 1983; Alvarez, 1998; 
Hillygus and Jackman, 2003). In the case of Chile’s 2005 election, held in a context of 
declining party identification among the electorate and increasing number of respondents 
not expressing any vote intention in opinion polls (Frei, 2003), short-term factors such as 
candidates’ campaigning style and the impressive economic record of President Lagos’ 
administration might have played a considerable influence on voters’ decisions (Angell 
and Reig, 2006; Navia, 2006).  
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Second, all previous individual-level studies of candidate choice in Chile (Frei, 2003; 
Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003) employed binary choice models, restricting comparisons 
to pairs of parties and imposing the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property 
on voters. The IIA condition is a very restrictive assumption to make about voters’ 
electoral behavior, in that it implies that the probability of a voter choosing an electoral 
alternative is independent of the other alternatives available and of the characteristics of 
these other alternatives (Alvarez, Nagler and Bowler, 2000; Train, 2003); in particular, 
the presence or absence of the candidate of the RN in the election would not change the 
relative probabilities of choosing any of the other candidates. Thus, imposing the IIA 
condition neglects the possibility that centrist voters who were disenchanted with the 
Concertación but were not willing to vote for a clear right-wing candidate might find a 
moderate conservative candidate attractive. Also, it implies that an Alianza supporter 
could not see the candidates of the UDI and the RN as substitutes, an assumption that is 
at odds with the view that coalition labels are meaningful for Chilean voters (Huneeus, 
2006; Alemán and Saiegh, 2007) and that might have been particularly inappropriate in 
the context of the 2005 election, when the declining popularity of Lavín and the better 
prospects of Piñera in a second-round runoff against Bachelet (Gamboa and Segovia, 
2006) might have driven UDI sympathizers to vote for the RN candidate for tactical 
reasons. The potential for strategic voting in the 2005 election was substantially increased 
due to the fact that opinion polls close to the election date indicated that a ballotage 
between Bachelet and one of the conservative candidates was almost certain, and that the 
contest between Lavín and Piñera for the second place in the first round was very tight 
(Angell and Reig, 2006).  
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Even if relaxing the IIA condition might not necessarily improve the model fit or lead 
to substantially different results regarding the determinants of voter choice (Horowitz, 
1980; Quinn and Martin, 1998), it allows addressing central substantive questions for the 
analysis of Chile’s 2005 election, namely whether Piñera’s entry into the race was 
determinant in bolstering Alianza’s vote support, and how it affected voters’ electoral 
behavior. While, prior to the election, Alianza leaders expressed concerns that the 
divisions between the two conservative candidates could weaken the right-wing coalition 
(Gamboa and Segovia, 2006), Piñera’s candidacy might in fact have contributed to its 
relative success in the presidential election, in which the right did considerably better 
than in the simultaneous legislative election and obtained more votes than the 
Concertación for the first time since Chile’s return to democracy (Navia, 2006). The 
impact of Piñera’s candidature on the election cannot be directly quantified using vote 
choice models that rely on the independence of irrelevant alternatives property such as 
the multinomial logit (Dow and Endersby, 2004). Therefore, these relevant questions 
have not been addressed in previous analyses of the 2005 election.  
In view of the computational complexity of fitting the multinomial probit model 
(Train, 2003), there have been relatively few applications of this model in the political 
science literature (e.g., Alvarez and Nagler, 1995; Alvarez, Nagler and Bowler, 2000; 
Dow and Endersby, 2004). Most applications have used maximum likelihood estimation, 
relying on asymptotic normality in making inferences about the error variance and 
covariance parameters. As shown by McCulloch and Rossi (1994), however, asymptotic 
approximations are quite problematic in the context of the multinomial probit model. The 
main advantage of the Bayesian approach based on Gibbs sampling is that it allows 
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obtaining arbitrarily precise approximations to the posterior densities, without relying on 
large-sample theory (McCulloch and Rossi, 1993; Jackman, 2004). In addition, it avoids 
direct evaluation of the likelihood function and the resulting convergence problems 
exhibited by maximum likelihood optimization, and is computationally more efficient 
than simulation-based methods of classical estimation (Kim, Kim and Heo, 2003). Hence, 
the Bayesian approach overcomes some of the main criticisms that have been leveled 
against the use of multinomial probit in electoral studies (Dow and Endersby, 2004). 
Furthermore, since the Bayesian framework allows for straightforward comparisons of 
models that can be used to operationalize alternative sets of hypothesis (Quinn and 
Martin, 1998), it is particularly well suited to examine the relative validity of the different 
explanations proposed to account for voters’ behavior in Chile.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an initial look 
at voting behavior in the 2005 Presidential election using survey data. Section 3 presents 
a multinomial probit model to analyze voter-choice in multi-party elections and describes 
the data and methodology used to fit the model to the Chilean case. Section 4 presents the 
most salient results, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.   A first look at Chile’s 2005 presidential election  
Using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems post-election survey 
(CSES, 2007), we provide preliminary evidence regarding the impact of different sets of 
variables on the support for each of the candidates running for office in the 2005 election: 
Michelle Bachelet, of the governing Concertación; Tomás Hirsch, of the left-wing 
coalition Juntos Podemos Más (JPM); and the two Alianza candidates, Joaquín Lavin 
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(UDI) and Sebastián Piñera (RN).  Table 1 presents the percentage of voters in the 
sample supporting each of the four candidates, based upon respondents’ relevant socio-
demographic traits, party identification, opinions regarding democracy and evaluation of 
the incumbent government.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
 
In accord with the assumption that an authoritarian/democratic cleavage is prevalent in 
the restructured Chilean party system, a strong division between voters regarding their 
attitudes towards democracy and their regime preferences can be seen in Table 1. Sixty-
five percent of the respondents who stated they were unsatisfied with democracy and 
79% of those stating that democracy is not always the best form of government supported 
the RN and UDI candidates. Interestingly, those expressing more critical views towards 
democracy tended to support the more moderate Piñera, although dissatisfaction with 
democracy, however, was higher for Lavín supporters.  
Socio-demographic variables also factor into the choice between the competing 
candidates, as seen in Table 1. The high support for Bachelet among women marked a 
clear difference with respect to previous Concertación candidates (Angell and Reig, 
2006; Huneeus, 2006). Hirsch did twice as well among younger, better-educated voters 
than among the older and less educated respondents. The electoral support-base of the 
two conservative candidates was also quite different, with Piñera having higher support 
than Lavín among better educated and wealthier voters. Religion seems to have strongly 
affected the choice for Hirsch: agnostic, atheists and respondents with no religious 
affiliation were much more likely to vote for Hirsch, while those belonging to a religious 
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denomination (Catholics and Christians, essentially) were more likely to choose one of 
the other three candidates.   
As for the effect of short-term factors, citizens’ assessments of the incumbent 
Concertación government clearly influenced the choice between Bachelet and the three 
candidates of the opposition. Eighty percent of the respondents expressing dissatisfaction 
with the performance of the incumbent administration voted for the two conservative 
parties UDI and RN.  The vote-share of Juntos Podemos Más was also disproportionately 
high among government critics, suggesting that Hirsch’s vocal disapproval of the 
government’s economic policies might have attracted the far-left voters disenchanted 
with the Concertación’s espousal of market economy and neo-liberal policies 
(Valenzuela and Scully, 1997; Navia, 2006). In contrast, 61% of those with favorable 
opinions of the government supported Bachelet. However, a majority of voters had 
positive evaluations of the government’s performance, reflecting the unusually high 
popularity of President Lagos among the electorate (Angell and Reig, 2006; Navia, 
2006). 
Finally, another remarkable fact emerging from Table 1 is the relationship between 
partisanship and vote choice, particularly for respondents identified with the 
Concertación and UDI in the sample: 8% of the former and more than 43% of the latter 
voted for Piñera in the election. As mentioned in the introduction, the fact that opinion 
polls indicated that Bachelet would easily defeat Lavín in a two-candidate runoff while 
Piñera would pose a more serious challenge to the Concertación (Gamboa and Segovia, 
2006) suggests that tactical voting might be the reason underlying the high electoral 
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support of the RN candidate among UDI sympathizers.1 This interpretation, however, 
does not account for the moderate support of Piñera among Concertación identifiers. 
Rather, the explanation in this case seems to be related to Piñera’s moderate positioning 
and his appeal to Christian Democrats during the electoral campaign. Figure 1 explores 
this issue further by plotting the distribution of votes among Concertación partisans, 
discriminated between Christian Democrats (CD) and other Concertación identifiers. As 
shown in the figure, almost 20% of respondents in the sample expressing identification 
with the CD voted for the RN, a percentage 6 times higher than for other partisans of the 
center-left coalition.   
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
 
 
Hence, this preliminary analysis suggests that, in line with the hypothesis underscoring 
the prevalence of an authoritarian/democratic cleavage in Chilean politics, voters’ views 
and attitudes towards democracy played a key role on their decision of whether to vote 
for the Concertación or the Alianza candidates. In contrast, while socio-demographic 
variables also influenced voter behavior, they did not clearly determine a division 
between supporters of the two main political coalitions. In addition, the evidence 
presented above reveals that election-specific factors such as the emergence of a 
moderate conservative candidate and voters’ strategic considerations also had a 
considerable influence on electoral behavior. This points to the fact that the different 
hypothesis proposed to account for voter behavior in Chile must be considered in the 
                                                 
1 Party identification is defined based on respondents’ answer to the question “Which party do 
you feel closer to?” in the CSES survey. 
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light of the particular political and institutional context of the 2005 election, and that 
previous analyses based entirely on citizens’ party identification would probably fail to 
provide a complete account of voting patterns in the presidential race.  
These bivariate relationships, however, do not allow us to assess the relative influence 
of the different variables on voter choice in a controlled way. In to assess which factors 
were more relevant in the 2005 election and to test alternative hypothesis about the 
determinants of voter behavior in Chile, we specify and estimate a model of multi-
candidate vote choice.  
 
3. A  multi-candidate model  of vote choice for the 2005 election 
In order to test the competing explanations and to account for possible substitution 
patterns between electoral choices, we specify and estimate a multinomial probit model 
that allows us to examine the effect of different individual characteristics on voter choice 
after controlling for other confounding factors, as well as to assess how changes in 
candidates’ spatial positions affect their expected vote-share. Unlike previous models 
applied in individual-level analysis of Chilean elections, the multinomial probit 
specification assumes that the voter simultaneously considers all the electoral options 
when making her choice, allowing us to test for the violation of the IIA assumption and 
to assess whether the relative probabilities of a voter choosing between any two 
candidates depends on the presence of other electoral options.2 
                                                 
2 The IIA assumption underlying logistic models can be tested on subsets of alternatives 
(Hausman and McFadden, 1984) and cross-alternative variables (McFadden, 1987). However, 
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Our model specification is grounded in the spatial voting and random utility 
maximization literature, and draws on Alvarez and Nagler (1995) and Alvarez, Bowler 
and Nagler (2000). We assume that the voter’s utility for each candidate is composed of a 
systemic component, specified as function of characteristics of the individuals and the 
candidates, and a stochastic component that represents the influence of unobserved 
factors on voters’ choice.  Following Alvarez and Nagler (1995), voter i ′s utility for 
candidate j , denoted by ,i jU , is given by:  
 
               ' ', , , ,    =Bachelet, Hirsch, Lavín, Piñerai j i j i j i jU z x jα δ ε= + +                         (1) 
 
where iz  is a vector of characteristics of the i
th voter (including a constant term), ,i jx  is a 
vector of characteristics of the j th candidate relative to the voter, jα  and δ  are vectors 
of parameters to be estimated, and ,i jε  is a disturbance term. We assume that the four 
error terms ( ),Bachelet ,Hirsch ,Lavín ,Piñera, , ,i i i iε ε ε ε  follow a multivariate normal 
distribution with mean vector 0 and variance-covariance matrix Σ , allowing the random 
components of utility to be correlated across parties. In line with random utility models, 
each voter is assumed to vote for the candidate that provides her with the highest utility; 
that is,  
 
                                            ( ),     if   maxi i j iY j U U= =                                                     (2) 
                                                                                                                                                 
rejection of IIA using these tests does not provide much guidance on the correct specification to 
use (Train, 2003). 
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where iY   is the observed voter choice,  Given that only differences in utility matter and 
thus any location shift will not change the observed vote, we can solve the identification 
problem by taking one party as the base alternative and expressing i ′s utility for the other 
candidates relative to her utility for the base alternative. Assuming, without loss of 
generality, that we take Piñera (RN) as the base alternative, and defining 
, , ,Piñera ,   Bachelet, Hirsch, Lavín,i k i k iU U U k= − =  we can express the random utility 
model as: 
 
                                                     ii i iU W β ε= +                                                          (3) 
with               
                                *3, ,i i iW z I X⎡ ⎤= ⊗⎣ ⎦   
' '
,Bachelet ,Piñera
* ' '
,Hirsch ,Piñera
' '
,Lavín ,Piñera
i i
i i i
i i
x x
X x x
x x
⎡ ⎤−⎢ ⎥= −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
,   and  
                              ( ) ( ), , , , , , 3, , 0,i i Bachelet i Piñera i Hirsch i Piñera i Lavín i Piñera Nε ε ε ε ε ε ε= − − − Σ ∼ . 
 
The parameters i ( ),θ β= Σ  are still not identified, because a scale shift will not change 
the observed choices.3 We follow McCulloch and Rossi (1994) and achieve identification 
by normalizing the parameters with respect to i1,1σ : i  i i  i( )' '' 1,1 1,1, / , /θ β β σ σ⎛ ⎞= Σ = Σ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ .  
The likelihood for the multinomial probit model is then given by  
                                                 
3 That is, i( ) i( )   0i ii iY U Y Uα α= ∀ > .  
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                             i ( ) i ( )' ' ' '
1
, , Pr | , ,
n
i
i
f Y W Y Wβ β
=
Σ = Σ∏                                              (4) 
                                    i ( ) i i ( ) i' ' ' '3, , , ,                  
j
i ii i i
A
P Y W U W dUβ φ βΣ = Σ∫                            (5) 
where 3φ  is the trivariate normal probability density function, and  
 
i i i( )
i i
, ,: max ,0         if , Bachelet,Hirsch,Lavín
: 0                              if  Piñera
i i k i k i
j
i i i
U U U Y k k
A
U U Y
−⎧ > = =⎪= ⎨⎪ < =⎩
. 
 
The posterior density of the parameters is given by Bayes theorem as   
 
                              i ( ) i ( ) i( ) ( )' ' ' ' ' ', , ,   W f Y Wπ β β π β πΣ ∝ Σ Σ                                       (6) 
 
where i( )'  π β and ( )'π Σ  denote the prior densities of i 'β  and  'Σ , respectively.  
Our source of data is the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems post-election survey 
(CSES, 2007). In line with the competing theories about the determinants of electoral 
behavior in Chile, we examine the effect of respondents’ socio-demographic 
characteristics, attitudes towards democracy and assessment of the incumbent Lagos’ 
government on their vote choice. The socio-demographic variables included in the model: 
Age; Education, recorded on an four point-scale ranging from no education to university 
degree; a dummy variable for Female; Income, by household quintile; and Religion, 
coded 1 for respondents belonging to a religious denomination (Catholicism and other 
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Christian faiths, essentially), 0 otherwise. We also include Regime preference, recording 
respondents’ agreement with the statement “Democracy is better than any other form of 
government”; Satisfaction with democracy, a variable reflecting how satisfied 
respondents are with the way democracy works in Chile; and Government evaluation, 
measures respondents’ assessment of the performance of Lagos’ government; the three 
variables are scored on four-point scales in ascending order. As an alternative, all 
variables coded on an ordered scale were discretized, with the lower category taken as 
baseline and dummy variables specified for the remaining categories; the main 
substantive findings reported in Section 4, based on the default parametrization, remain 
unchanged under this alternative specification.4  
In addition, in line with the prevalent spatial model of voting (Hinich and Munger, 
1994; Merrill and Grofman, 1999), we include Ideological distance, a measure of 
respondents’ spatial perceived ideological distance from each of the candidates in the 
model, defined as the squared difference between the respondent’s self-reported 
placement on an 11-point left-right scale and her placement of each of the parties on the 
same scale (Merrill and Grofman, 1999). The left-right ideological dimension plays a key 
role in terms of popular perceptions of party differences in Chile (Valenzuela and Scully, 
1997; Tironi and Agüero, 1999), where there are relatively minor differences between the 
main political forces regarding fundamental political and economic issues (Scully, 1995; 
Fuentes, 1999; Angell and Reig, 2006). Although the CSES survey asks Chilean 
respondents only about parties’ positions, we compared the ideological locations obtained 
                                                 
4 A complete set of results using the alternative coding scheme is available from the authors upon 
request.  
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from the CSES survey with candidates’ perceived positions form the October-November 
2005 Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP, 2005) national survey; the ordering of the 
candidates on the left-right scale is the same in both surveys, and differences in the mean 
of respondents’ placements of the candidates between the surveys are quite small.5 While 
the results reported below are based on the distance measure computed from parties’ 
perceived location in the CSES survey in order to avoid statistical complexities brought 
about by combining information from different sources (Lohr, 2005; Raghuanthan et al., 
2006), using the candidates’ placements obtained from the CEP survey yields similar 
results.6  
The model was fit through Markov chain Monte Carlo simulations, using McCulloch 
and Rossi’s (1994) Gibbs sampling algorithm.7,8 As mentioned in the introduction, 
Bayesian procedures based on Gibbs sampling allow making exact finite sample 
inferences without relying on large-sample theory (McCulloch and Rossi, 1994; Kim, 
Kim and Heo, 2003). Because of the discrete nature of the dependent variable, a 
considerable sample size may be required for accurate asymptotic approximations 
(McCulloch and Rossi, 1994). Hence, the Bayesian approach is particularly appropriate 
                                                 
5 Less than 0.9 points on an eleven-point scale for each of the candidates.   
6 Ibidem, footnote 4. 
7 See McCulloch and Rossi (1994), McCulloch, Polson and Rossi (2000) and Imai and van Dyk 
(2005) for a detailed presentation of the sampling algorithm. A general discussion of Gibbs 
sampling can be found in Gelfland and Smith (1990) and Casella and George (1992). 
8 The Gibbs sampler was implemented using the ‘bayesm’ package in R (Rossi, Allenby and 
McCulloch, 2005). 
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given the relatively small dataset available to analyze the 2005 election.9 The Bayesian 
approach is also better suited to deal with a large number of alternatives than the 
simulation-based methods of classical estimation, which require deriving the likelihood 
function with respect to each element of the variance-covariance matrix, thus resulting in 
substantial increases in computational time (Train, 2003; Kim et al., 2003).  
In addition, the Bayesian model-fitting strategy allows for comparison of competing 
models and explanations of voter behavior in a straightforward and computationally 
practical way using Bayes factors (Kass and Raftery, 1995). The Bayes factor for model 
jM  relative to model kM  is given by  
 
                           
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ),
,  
,  
j j j j jj
j k
k k k k k k
p y M p M dp y M
B
p y M p y M p M d
θ θ θ
θ θ θ= =
∫
∫                                   (7)  
 
where, in the application of Section 4,  we used the harmonic mean of the likelihood 
values evaluated at the posterior draws (Newton and Raftery, 1994) as an estimate for 
( ) ,   ,xp y M x j k= : 
                                         l ( ) ( )( ) 11
1
1| |
R
r
x x
r
p y M p y
R
θ
−−
=
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑                                           (8). 
 
                                                 
9 McCulloch and Rossi (1994) show that non-normality of finite sampling distributions of the 
error variance-covariance parameters can arise with even 1,000 observations per parameter, 
indicating that “asymptotic theory may be of little use for the MNP model” (p. 219).  
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Diffuse proper priors were assumed for the parameters in the model, 
i ( )1,   N Bβ β −∼ and  ( )~  ,Inverse Wishart v VΣ , with 10,  0.0001 ,  B Iβ −= =  6,  v V vI= =  
(McCulloch, Polson and Rossi, 2000); routine sensitivity analyses were performed to 
assess the robustness of the results with respect to different priors and starting values for 
the sampling algorithm, yielding similar results. A single Markov chain was run for 
3,000,000 cycles, with the first 50,000 discarded as burn-in; while McCulloch and 
Rossi’s (1994) sampler is quite easy to implement, high correlation between the 
parameters and the latent variables introduced by the data augmentation algorithm used to 
form the Gibbs sampler (Tanner and Wong, 1987; McCulloch and Rossi, 1994; Imai and 
van Dyk, 2005), coupled with a high-dimensional parameter space, determined that the 
Markov chain was extremely slow in navigating the state space, and some parameters 
required more than 2,000,000 draws to converge.10 The results presented in Section 4 are 
based on the last 50,000 Gibbs sample draws of the parameters.  
 
  4.   Empirical results  
4.1 Multinomial probit estimates 
Table 2 reports the posterior means and 95% Bayesian Credible Intervals of the 
parameters of the multinomial probit model.  The model correctly predicts voter choice in 
59.6% of the cases, while a “null model” predicting that voter choice for each respondent 
will take the value of the most common outcome in the sample (Concertación) correctly 
                                                 
10 Convergence was assessed using Geweke’s (1992) and diagnostic based on a test for equality 
of the means of the first 10% and last 50% of the Markov chain.  
 18
classifies 51.4% of the vote. Such a model, however, would provide no information about 
the effect of the predictors on the relative probability of voting for the different parties.  
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
The summaries of the posterior densities shed substantial light on the relative the 
relative influence of respondent’s socio-demographic characteristics, attitudes towards 
democracy and evaluation of government performance on their electoral behavior. First, 
regarding the effect of socio-demographic variables, wealthier voters were more likely to 
vote for the Renewal Party (RN) than for Concertación or UDI, and younger voters were 
also more likely to choose Piñera over Lavín. None of these variables significantly 
affected the choice between the RN candidate and Hirsch. In contrast, and in line with the 
data presented in Table 1, more educated voters and those not belonging to any religious 
denomination were more likely to vote for JPM than for RN, but these variables did not 
affect the choice between Piñera and the other two candidates at the 95% level.  Although 
these estimates indicate that socio-demographic factors did influence voters’ electoral 
behavior, they did not necessarily affect the choice between Concertación and Alianza. 
Rather, the evidence indicates that some of the socio-economic variables that had a 
positive effect on the probability of choosing Bachelet over Piñera – e.g., Income - also 
increased the probability of voting for Lavín over the candidate of the Renewal Party.  
On the other hand, respondents’ regime preferences and their evaluation of the 
incumbent government significantly affected the choice between Bachelet and the two 
candidates of the Alianza. Respondents who stated that democracy is always the best 
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form of government and those expressing favorable views of Lagos’ administration were 
more likely to vote for Bachelet than for Piñera, but this variable did not affect vote 
choice between the UDI and the RN candidates. Voters satisfied with the way in which 
democracy works in Chile were more likely to vote for Bachelet and for Lavín than for 
Piñera, but they were less likely to choose Hirsch over the RN candidate.  
A remarkable result emerging from Table 2 is that, although the coefficient of 
Ideological distance has the expected negative sign, in line with the spatial voting 
literature, it is not statistically significant at the usual confidence levels. This finding is 
robust to alternative definitions of the ideological distance measure, such as using the 
absolute value rather than the square of the difference between the respondents’ and the 
parties' locations on the left-right scale or approximating parties’ location using the mean 
of respondents’ placements (Rabinowitz and MacDonald, 1989; Alvarez and Nagler, 
1995). Nonetheless, it must be mentioned that 24% of the respondents in the sample who 
placed themselves in the far-left end of the ideological scale stated that they had voted for 
one of the two Alianza candidates. This suggests that this result might stem from the 
methodological difficulties inherent in collecting perceptual data (Aldrich and McKelvey, 
1977; King, Murray, Salomon and Tandon, 2004) or from flaws in the CSES 
questionnaire. In order to address this problem, we re-estimated the model using 
estimates of respondents’ self-placement and parties’ locations obtained through Aldrich 
and McKelvey’s (1977) method of scaling, with virtually identical outcomes.  Hence, 
although we cannot discard the hypothesis that this result is mainly driven by problems in 
the CSES questionnaire and well-known difficulties associated to the use of ordinal 
scales (King et al., 2004), a possible explanation lies in the absence of important policy 
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differences between the three main candidates and in the fact that the first round of the 
election was presented as a choice between candidates’ personal traits, rather than 
between parties or ideological positions (Gamboa and Segovia, 2006).   
A different interpretation has to do with the extent of tactical voting among the 
Chilean electorate. Given the high probability of a ballotage and the highly disputed 
contest between Piñera and Lavín for the second place in the election, voters - in 
particular, Concertación sympathizers - might have had an incentive to cast a ballot for a 
candidate other than their most preferred one in order to affect the race between the two 
candidates of the Alianza and to influence who would face Bachelet in the second-round 
runoff (Cox, 1997).  The relationship between partisanship and vote-choice reported in 
Table 1 and the high percentage of split-ticket voting between the presidential and 
legislative races (Navia, 2006) suggests that tactical voting might have been relatively 
important in the 2005 election; we explore this argument in Section 4.3 below.  
Finally, as seen at the bottom of Table 2, we find a positive correlation between 
Concertación and UDI and a negative correlation between JPM and UDI. Although the 
positive correlation between Concertación and UDI is at odds with received knowledge 
about citizens’ partisan identities in Chile, it is in line with Angell and Reig’s (2006) 
observation that the RN candidate was disliked by a significant proportion of Lavín's 
supporters, and might help account for the fact that a considerable percentage of them 
voted for Bachelet in the second-round runoff against Piñera (Gamboa and Segovia, 
2006; Huneeus, 2006). These results indicate that the IIA assumption is violated and that 
models that impose such condition might produce incorrect inferences about voter choice 
in Chile’s 2005 election (Alvarez, Bowler and Nagler, 2000). More importantly, such 
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models would neglect the fact that Piñera’s entry into the election significantly affected 
citizens’ probabilities of voting for the other competing candidates.  
 
4.2 The effect of individual characteristics on vote choice 
The coefficients reported in Table 2 are difficult to interpret directly due to the 
nonlinear functional form of the multinomial probit model and the fact that the voters’ 
utilities are expressed with respect to a baseline alternative (Piñera). In order to assess the 
relative impact of the different factors proposed to account for voter behavior in Chile 
and to be able to make pairwise comparisons between candidates, we estimate the 
marginal effect of the individual-specific variables on the probability of voting for each 
candidate using “first differences” (King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000). For each 
respondent in the sample, we compute vectors of choice probabilities 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Bachelet , Hirsch , Lavín , Piñerai i i iP P P P⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  based on the value of the regressors and 
the Gibbs sample draws of the models’ parameters using the GHK algorithm 
(Hajivassiliou, McFadden and Ruud, 1996). Then we alter one independent variable at a 
time and recompute the predicted probabilities for each respondent, holding all other 
variables constant. Finally, we average the differences between these probabilities over 
all simulations and respondents, obtaining the mean value and 95% Credible Intervals for 
the causal effect of the variable under analysis. Table 3 summarizes the average impact 
on the probability of support for each party of changing the values of the predictors from 
one end of the scale to the other.11  
                                                 
11 In the case of the binary variables, Female and Religion, we measure the impact of a 
change from 0 to 1. 
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[Table 3 here] 
 
 
 
In line with the results presented in Table 2, the estimated first differences do not 
support the hypothesis that socioeconomic or religious cleavages played a key role in the 
choice between leftist and conservative candidates. While, ceteris paribus, higher 
education levels increased the probability of voting for the left-wing Juntos Podemos 
Más by 11 percentage points, it reduced the likelihood of voting for Concertación by 
0.21. Respondents belonging to households in the wealthiest income quintile were 0.18 
more likely to vote for Piñera than those in households at the bottom quintile, but they 
were also 0.04 more likely to vote for Hirsch. Also, respondents belonging a religious 
denomination were 0.18 less likely to cast a ballot for Hirsch than atheist or agnostic 
voters, but this variable had no statistically significant effect on the probability of voting 
for Bachelet or for either of the two candidates of the Alianza.  
In contrast, opinions about regime preference and government performance did have 
substantive and opposite effects on the probability of voting for the two leftist and the 
two conservative candidates. Respondents would be on average 0.33 more likely to vote 
for Bachelet and 0.02 more likely to vote for Hirsch if they felt that democracy is always 
the best form of government, but they would be 0.26 less likely to vote for Piñera. Also, 
moving from a very negative to a very positive evaluation of the incumbent government 
increased the likelihood of voting for Bachelet and Hirsch by 0.66 and 0.09, respectively, 
while reducing the average probability of supporting Lavín and Piñera by 54 and 22 
percentage points. Given the success of the President Lagos’s economic and social 
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policies and the fact that neither of the UDI nor the RN candidates proposed substantial 
transformations in this regard, it seems reasonable to assume that the strong positive 
effect of a negative evaluation of the government on the probability of supporting the 
Alianza is not necessarily reflecting retrospective voting. Rather, it might be related to a 
series of important democratizing reforms implemented during Lagos’ term in office, 
such as the elimination of designated senators and the restoration of the presidential 
power to designate and remove the heads of the different branches of the military, as well 
as to the adoption of divisive “symbolic” measures like the reparations to victims of 
human rights violations (Angell and Reig, 2006; Navia, 2006).  
On the other hand, although Satisfaction with democracy also had a significant 
influence on voter choice, the effect of this variable does not reveal a clear left-right 
division. On average, moving from a very negative to a very positive opinion of the way 
in which democracy works in Chile increased the likelihood of voting for Bachelet by 
0.42, but decreased the probability of voting for either Hirsch or Piñera by 0.19. Notice, 
however, that the causal effect of this variable on the probability of choosing Lavín is not 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The positive relationship between dissatisfaction 
with the functioning of democracy and the likelihood of voting for Hirsch and Piñera 
might reflect a demand for alternative electoral options among voters disenchanted with 
the two major blocs dominating electoral competition, rather than respondents’ anti-
democratic values. While Hirsch adopted a critical position towards both the 
Concertación and the conservative opposition during the campaign, Piñera emphasized 
the need to build a broad center-right “New Coalition” based on “Christian Humanist” 
 24
principles to replace the Concertación/Alianza dichotomy (Angell and Reig, 2006; 
Gamboa and Segovia, 2006).  
In order to better illustrate the relative validity of the hypotheses emphasizing the role 
of socio-economic and authoritarian-democratic cleavages, Figure 2 summarizes the 
effect on the choice probabilities of a hypothetical voter of shifting all the predictors used 
to operationalize each approach from the lower to the upper end of the scale.12 The upper 
panel of Figure 2 plots the probabilities of voting for each candidate as a function of the 
voter’s views on democracy and government performance, while holding the socio-
demographic variables at the mean sample values. The lower panel reproduces the 
analysis, varying the voter’s education and income levels and fixing the remaining 
predictors at their average values. 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
The comparison of the upper and lower panels in Figure 2 suggests that differences in 
the attitudes towards democracy and the evaluation of the government are the main 
source of divide between Alianza and Concertación supporters. Going from the lower to 
the upper end of the scale on Regime Preference, Satisfaction with democracy and 
                                                 
12 Our hypothetical voter is male, of mean age, education and income, and belongs to a religious 
denomination; his opinions on democracy and the government and his ideological distance from 
each party are set at the mean sample values. Although the values of the independent variables 
used to construct this hypothetical voter influence the baseline probability estimates, they do not 
substantively influence the marginal effect of the predictors on the choice probabilities. 
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Government evaluation increases the probability of voting for Bachelet from 0 to 87 
percent, while decreasing the likelihood of voting for Lavín and Piñera from 0.25 and 
0.65 to 0 and 0.01, respectively. Simultaneous increases in Education and Income also 
have a substantial effect on the likelihood of choosing Bachelet, lowering it by as much 
as 50 percentage points, from 0.77 to 0.27. However, the effect of such increases on the 
likelihood of supporting the candidates of the Alianza is much smaller, raising it from 
0.11 to 0.27 in the case of Piñera, while having virtually no effect on the vote for Lavín. 
Hence, our findings support the arguments underscoring the role of the authoritarian-
democratic in the choice between Concertación and Alianza (Tironi and Agüero, 1999; 
Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003). In contrast, the evidence presented above shows that 
socio-economic and cultural factors are the main determinants of the support for Hirsch.  
It is worth mentioning, however, that the comparison of a model including only socio-
economic variables vis a vis a model including only respondents’ views on democracy 
and the government does not favor any of the two specifications: the Bayes factor 
between the second and the first model is 1.09, and remains essentially unchanged (1.11) 
when including the spatial distance measure in both specifications. Hence, neither the 
hypothesis emphasizing the role of social and cultural cleavages nor the theory 
underscoring the authoritarian-democratic divide provides a single best explanation of 
voter choice in Chile’s 2005 election.  
 
4.3 The role of the electoral context: candidate competition and voter calculus  
The salience of the authoritarian-democratic cleavage in structuring the competition 
between the two main political blocs in the 2005 election suggests that Chile is still, in 
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the words of Constable and Valenzuela (1991), a ‘nation of enemies’. In this context, it is 
particularly relevant to examine whether Piñera’s candidacy and his campaign strategy 
aimed at distancing himself from the far right and the military dictatorship, contributed 
not only to his victory over Lavín in the contest for the second place in the election, but 
also to increase the support for the Alianza.  
  In order to do so, we exploit the fact that the multinomial probit model allows us to 
estimate the effect of the entry of Piñera in the presidential race and determine where the 
RN votes had gone in his absence. For each respondent in the sample, we calculate his 
expected utility difference for Bachelet, Hirsch and Lavín with respect to Piñera using the 
Gibbs sampling draws of the coefficients. Based on these differential utilities and on the 
draws of elements of the variance-covariance matrix, we can simulate vectors of choice 
probabilities for Bachelet, Hirsch and Lavín in a three-candidate race and estimate their 
expected vote-shares. In order to compare the results with those obtained under a scenario 
in which Piñera had been the only candidate of the Alianza, we also computed the 
probability of each voter choosing between Bachelet, Hirsch and Piñera in a three-
candidate race with Lavín omitted. Table 4 reports the simulated vote-shares of the 
candidates in these two hypothetical three-candidate races and contrast them with the 
model’s predictions for the four-candidate election.       
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
As seen in the table, in a four-candidate election, our model predicts an expected vote-
share of 50.9% for Bachelet, 8.2% for Hirsch, 26.4% for Piñera and 14.5% for Lavín, 
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close to the actual proportion of votes for each candidate in the sample (Table 1).13 While 
the expected vote-share for the two candidates of the Alianza would add to almost 41% in 
the four-candidate election, none of the two conservative candidates running alone would 
have obtained more than 34% of the vote in a three-candidate race against Bachelet and 
Hirsch. This indicates that Piñera’s candidacy was an important determinant of Alianza’s 
relative success in the 2005 election, increasing the support for the center-right in the 
sample by more than 10 percentage points with respect to the hypothetical case in which 
Lavín had been the only candidate of the coalition, as originally expected. Moreover, the 
support for Hirsch among the respondents in the sample would more than double under 
this scenario when compared to the four-candidate race, suggesting that the RN candidate 
was backed by a segment of voters who were not willing to cast a ballot for either 
Bachelet or Lavín. This interpretation is in line with the results in Tables 2 and 3 showing 
that Hirsch and Piñera had a strong support among voters disenchanted with the workings 
of democracy in Chile and who might have been looking for alternatives to the two 
“traditional” electoral options.  
Figure 3 explores this issue further, plotting the distribution of the candidates’ vote-
share among different groups of respondents in both hypothetical three-candidate 
elections. The upper panel of Figure 3 summarizes the model’s predictions for a three-
candidate race between Bachelet, Hirsch and Lavín, plotting the distribution of the 
support for the candidates among those respondents who voted for Piñera in the actual 
election, among Christian Democrats (DC), and among the rest of the respondents in the 
                                                 
13 In the CSES sub-sample of 751 respondents we use, there is a positive bias for Bachelet and 
Hirsch and a negative bias for Lavín, which our multinomial probit model reproduces. 
 28
sample. Analogously, the bottom panel of Figure 3 presents the results for a three-
candidate election with Lavín omitted, plotting the distribution of the support for 
Bachelet, Hirsch and Piñera among those who voted for Lavín in the presidential 
election, among DC partisans and among the remaining respondents. 
 
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
 
 
The upper panel shows that, in a three-candidate race between Bachelet, Hirsch and 
Lavín, respondents who voted for Piñera in the actual election were more likely to vote 
for Juntos Podemos Más than the rest of the respondents in the sample. Also, comparing 
the two hypothetical three-candidate races between Bachelet, Hirsch and a single Alianza 
contender, the support for JPM among respondents who voted for Piñera in the 
presidential election would have been twice as large as among respondents who voted for 
Lavín. Hence, far from weakening the Alianza’s electoral prospects, the division between 
the UDI and the RN candidates seems to have actually increased the coalition’s vote-
share. While the Alianza retained its customary right-wing vote, Piñera’s candidacy 
allowed the coalition to expand its electoral appeal to some citizens dissatisfied with the 
workings of democracy in Chile and demanding alternative electoral options; Lavín, 
Alianza’s “natural” candidate, would not have offered an attractive choice for this group 
of voters.  
Nonetheless, the evidence reported in Table 4 and Figure 3 also point out that Piñera’s  
success was, to a large extent, due to the specific circumstances surrounding the 2005 
election and, in particular, to the uncertainty about which of the two Alianza candidates 
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would join Bachelet in the almost certain second-round runoff (Angell and Reig, 2006; 
Gamboa and Segovia, 2006). Three main results back up this claim. First, as seen in the 
upper panel of Figure 3, Piñera voters were more likely to vote for Lavín than for the 
other contestants if the RN candidate had not entered the race, and the expected vote-
share of the UDI among them is much higher than among the other respondents in the 
sample. Hence, Piñera seems to have attracted many conservative voters who would have 
otherwise voted for Lavín and who might have seen the RN candidate as a more viable 
option in a second-round runoff against Bachelet. Second, as seen in the third column of 
Table 4, even though the Alianza would had done slightly better in a three-candidate race 
in which Piñera, rather than Lavín, had been the coalition’s only nominee, Bachelet’s 
expected vote-share among respondents in the sample would have peaked at more than 
57% under this scenario. Moreover, Hirsch’s support in this case would remain 
essentially unchanged in comparison to the actual four-candidate race. Hence, some 
voters that would support the minority candidate in an election with Bachelet and Lavín 
as real contenders for the presidential office would chose to cast a ‘useful’ vote for the 
Concertación in a less polarized election in which Piñera was the only nominee of the 
Alianza. Finally, although Christian Democrats were twice as likely to vote for Piñera 
than for Lavín in the actual election (Figure 1), Figure 3 shows that their propensity to 
vote for Piñera and for Lavín in the two hypothetical three-candidate races would not be 
significantly different. This result indicates that some respondents who voted for the 
National Renewal Party in order to prevent Lavín from advancing to the second round 
would have had no incentive to do so in a three-candidate election with Bachelet and 
Piñera as the main aspirants for office. 
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Therefore, our findings underscore the fact that the political and institutional context 
played a key role in explaining Piñera success and Alianza’s unprecedented support in the 
2005 election. In particular, tactical voting seems to have been an important determinant 
of the support for the RN candidate. Interestingly, however, the strategic calculus of 
Chilean voters corresponds only in part to the predictions of received models of strategic 
vote under top-two runoff (Myerson and Weber, 1993; Cox, 1997). In line with the 
theoretical literature, Piñera’s support among UDI sympathizers might reflect the desire 
of conservative voters to coordinate on the candidate of the Alianza that, according to 
public opinion polls, stood the best chance in a two-candidate runoff against Bachelet. In 
contrast, his support among Concertación partisans and potential Hirsch voters indicates 
that strategic voting among center-left and left-wing respondents stemmed from their 
desire to exclude Lavín from the ballotage, rather than to improve the probability of 
victory for their most-favored candidate (Cox, 1997).  
Again, this calls attention to the persistence of the authoritarian/democratic cleavage 
and its influence on the election results. The prevalence of this division in the society, 
together with the broad consensus over economic and social issues and strong party and 
coalition labels, impose powerful limitations to party leaders and political elites intending 
to alter their long-established electoral coalitions (Valenzuela and Scully, 1997). Their 
success in doing so might depend on their ability to shift their bases of electoral 
competition by politicizing new dimensions of conflict that cross coalitions and partisan 
lines, such as the ones underlying the growing “demand for rights” among the electorate 
and the increased debate over moral and social issues (Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003; 
Angell and Reig, 2006). 
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5.   Final remarks 
The 2005 election in Chile had several unusual characteristics. Among them, the 
presence of two viable conservative candidates marked a clear difference with previous 
elections. In this paper, we specify and fit a Bayesian multinomial probit model to study 
the presidential race, accounting for the multi-party character of the election and allowing 
estimation of substitution patterns among the candidates that enable us to assess how 
their expected vote-shares would change under alternative electoral scenarios. The 
Bayesian approach is particularly well suited for analyzing this election, given its 
advantages over classical estimation techniques for dealing with a relatively large number 
of alternatives and small sample sizes, as well as for providing a practical way of testing 
competing hypothesis and statistical models.  
 Our results shed light on the debate about the transformation of the political system in 
Chile and the redefinition of voters’ preferences since the re-establishment of democracy. 
In line with Tironi and Agüero (1999), we find that voters’ regime preferences and their 
attitudes towards democracy played a substantial role in the choice between the 
candidates of the Concertación and the Alianza. Earlier works suggested that the 
authoritarian-democratic cleavage would probably lose its influence over time as the 
memories of the dictatorship receded, as democracy was consolidated and as parties 
found new political issues to mobilize their supporters (Valenzuela and Scully, 1997). 
However, our findings for the 2005 election show that, sixteen years after the plebiscite 
that marked the end of Pinochet’s rule, voters’ electoral behavior still reflects the 
durability of the division between supporters and critics of the military regime.  
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In addition, our analysis underscores the considerable impact of the particular electoral 
context of the 2005 presidential race on voter choice, an aspect that has received 
relatively little attention in previous analyses of Chilean elections. Specifically, we show 
that the entry of a second conservative candidate into the presidential race increased the 
vote of the right, gathering the support of some Christian Democrats and, especially, of 
voters who were not inclined to favor either Bachelet or Lavín. We also find that much of 
Piñera’s support was due to strategic calculus on the part of voters in view of the almost 
certain second-round runoff and the tight contest between Lavín and Piñera for the 
second place in the first round of the election. An in-depth analysis of this argument, 
however, requires developing a statistical model to estimate the amount of strategic 
voting in multiparty elections under top-two runoff, an extension that we leave for further 
research. 
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Figures and tables 
 
Table 1 
Vote Choice by Respondents’ Views and Characteristics* 
  Bachelet (Concertación)
Hirsch 
(JPM) 
Lavín 
(UDI) 
Piñera 
(RN) 
  % % % % 
 
N 
       
Age 18 -29 45.05 12.87 8.91 33.17 202 
 30-44 53.23 11.03 15.97 19.77 263 
 45-64 53.36 5.83 15.25 25.56 223 
 65+ 55.56 6.35 23.81 14.28 63 
       
Education None 37.50 0.00 37.50 25.00 8 
 Primary 66.41 5.47 11.72 16.41 128 
 Secondary 50.00 8.55 14.74 26.70 468 
 University 42.86 17.01 14.97 25.17 147 
       
Gender Female 56.56 8.20 13.66 21.58 366 
 Male 46.23 10.91 15.32 27.53 385 
       
Household Income 1st quintile 57.89 6.58 22.37 13.16 76 
 2nd quintile 55.66 8.49 13.52 22.33 318 
 3rd quintile 47.89 11.05 13.16 27.89 190 
 4th quintile 43.38 11.76 12.50 32.35 136 
 5th quintile 45.16 9.68 22.58 22.58 31 
       
Religious  Yes 52.38 6.35 15.56 25.71 630 
Denomination No 45.45 26.45 9.09 19.01 121 
       
Democracy is the best  Disagree strongly 12.50 25.00 0.00 62.50 8 
Form of government Disagree 14.55 3.64 32.73 49.09 55 
 Agree 46.82 9.92 16.79 26.46 393 
 Agree strongly 65.08 9.83 8.47 16.61 295 
       
Satisfaction with Unsatisfied 13.51 29.73 16.21 40.54 37 
democracy in Chile Not very satisfied 24.78 8.84 26.99 39.38 226 
 Fairly satisfied 61.46 9.43 9.97 19.14 371 
 Very satisfied 82.05 5.13 4.27 8.55 117 
       
Government  Very bad 0.00 16.67 16.67 66.67 12 
Evaluation Bad 7.32 13.01 41.46 38.21 123 
 Good 55.04 8.40 11.34 25.21 476 
 Very good 81.43 10.00 1.43 7.14 140 
       
Party identification Concertación 83.33 5.56 3.33 7.78 90 
 JPM 33.33 66.67 0.00 0.00 15 
 UDI 0.00 0.00 57.14 42.86 22 
 39
 RN 0.00 0.00 20.69 79.31 29 
 Others 25.00 12.50 37.50 25.00 8 
 Independents 51.79 9.37 14.48 24.36 587 
       
Sample  51.44 9.58 14.70 24.49 751 
* Table entries are the percentage of each row-variable voting for the designated candidate.  
Percentages sum to 100 across rows. 
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         Figure 1: Distribution of votes among Concertación identifiers. The  
         figure shows the percentage of electoral support for each of the competing 
         parties among respondents identified with the Concertación in the 2005 election. 
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Table 2 
Posterior means and 95% Bayesian Credible Intervals (in parenthesis)  
for the parameters of the multinomial probit model  
Coefficients Bachelet/Piñera Hirsch/Piñera Lavín/Piñera 
Intercept 
-1.88 
(-3.83, -0.73) 
-0.11 
(-0.57, 0.31) 
-1.02 
(-2.03, -0.06) 
Age 
0.11 
(-0.00, 0.23) 
0.00 
(-0.06, 0.07) 
0.20 
(0.04, 0.38) 
Education 
-0.17 
(-0.36, 0.02) 
0.13 
(0.02, 0.24) 
-0.07 
(-0.31, 0.17) 
Female 
0.11 
(-0.09, 0.30) 
-0.01 
(-0.11, 0.13) 
0.10 
(-0.13, 0.35) 
Income 
-0.17 
(-0.27, -0.06) 
-0.01 
(-0.08, 0.06) 
-0.17 
(-0.34, -0.04) 
Religion 
0.09 
(-0.15, 0.34) 
-0.34 
(-0.52, -0.17) 
0.21 
(-0.10, 0.60) 
Regime preference 
0.19 
(0.02, 0.36) 
0.02 
(-0.07, 0.11) 
0.08 
(-0.15, 0.28) 
Satisfaction with democracy  
0.33 
(0.13, 0.51) 
-0.13 
(-0.24, -0.04) 
0.26 
(0.06, 0.48) 
Government evaluation 
0.31 
(0.07, 0.66) 
0.07 
(-0.02, 0.17) 
-0.13 
(-0.46, 0.18) 
Ideological distance 
-0.01 
(-0.01, 0.01) 
 42
    
Correlations    
,Concertación JPMρ  
-0.78 
(-1.00, 0.27) 
,Concertación UDIρ  
0.92 
(0.55, 1.00) 
,JPM UDIρ  
-0.93 
(-1.00, -0.63) 
 
% Correctly predicted (vs. Null Model*):  59.6% (51.44%) 
Number of observations: 751 
*The null model predicts that voter choice for each respondent will take the value of the most 
common outcome in the sample. 
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Table 3 
Marginal effect of individual-specific variables on voter choice  
Variable 
Bachelet 
(Concertación) 
Hirsch 
(JPM) 
Lavín 
(UDI) 
Piñera 
(RN) 
Age 
0.00 
(-0.02, 0.01) 
-0.07 
(-0.18, -0.01) 
0.07 
(0.01, 0.18) 
0.00 
(-0.01,0.01) 
Education 
-0.21 
(-0.31, -0.01) 
0.11 
(0.04, 0.23) 
0.04 
(-0.10, 0.10) 
0.07 
(-0.03, 0.15) 
Female 
0.02 
(0.00, 0.03) 
0.00 
(-0.01, 0.01) 
0.02 
(0.00, 0.04) 
-0.03 
(-0.04, -0.01) 
Income 
-0.21 
(-0.27, -0.01) 
0.04 
(0.01, 0.12) 
-0.01 
(-0.17, 0.00) 
0.18 
(0.03, 0.24) 
Religion 
0.04 
(-0.04, 0.10) 
-0.17 
(-0.28, -0.06) 
0.02 
(0.00, 0.07) 
0.11 
(0.00, 0.25) 
Regime preference 
0.33 
(0.03, 0.47) 
0.02 
(0.01, 0.05) 
-0.10 
(-0.20, 0.10) 
-0.26 
(-0.33, -0.14) 
Satisfaction with 
democracy 
0.42 
(0.18, 0.52) 
-0.19 
(-0.38, -0.08) 
-0.04 
(-0.11, 0.13) 
-0.01 
(-0.31, -0.01) 
Government evaluation 
0.66 
(0.33, 0.85) 
0.09 
(0.02, 0.23) 
-0.54 
(-0.73, -0.29) 
-0.22 
(-0.35, -0.11) 
95% Credible Intervals reported in parenthesis. 
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Figure 2: Effect of views on democracy and the government and of socio-
economic variables on choice probabilities. The upper panel plots the probabilities 
of voting for each candidate as a function Regime preference, Satisfaction with 
democracy and Government evaluation. The lower panels plots the choice 
probabilities as functions of Education and Income.  
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Table 4 
Expected vote-shares of the candidates under alternative electoral scenarios 
(in percentage points) 
Three-candidate races 
Candidate Four-candidate race 
without Piñera without Lavín 
Bachelet 
(Concertación) 
50.87 
(48.34, 53.31) 
51.64 
(49.04, 54.27) 
57.10 
(54.83, 59.56) 
Hirsch (JPM) 
8.19 
(6.83, 9.79) 
17.52 
(15.31, 19.90) 
9.57 
(8.03, 11.23) 
Lavín (UDI) 
14.53 
(12.74, 16.72) 
30.84 
(23.38, 33.81) 
- 
Piñera (RN) 
26.41 
(23.81, 28.17) 
- 
33.33 
(31.60, 35.12) 
95% Credible Intervals reported in parenthesis. 
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Figure 3: Predicted vote-shares in the two hypothetical three-candidate races. 
The upper panel plots the distribution of support for Bachelet, Hirsch and Lavín 
among different groups of respondents in a three-candidate race with Piñera omitted. 
Analogously, the lower panel plots the expected-vote share of Bachelet, Hirsch and 
Piñera in a three-candidate race with Lavín omitted.  
 
 
